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 Is the EU diff erent? Comparing the diversity 
of national and EU-level systems of interest 
organisations 




 The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being 
biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars 
attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or 
not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. 
We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: 
France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We diff erentiate system, policy 
domain and organisational factors and examine their eff ects on interest group 
diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards 
the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU 
interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in 
the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better 
capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These 
fi ndings suggest that the EU is less of a  sui generis system than commonly assumed 
and imply the need for more fi ne-grained analyses of interest group diversity. 
 
 Is the European Union interest group population diff erent from other interest 
group populations? According to most experts the answer is yes, especially 
on two dimensions. On the one end, there is widespread concern that the EU 
is biased towards business interest organisations because their proportion is 
larger in the EU than in domestic interest group populations, leading observ-
ers to conclude that the EU system is more receptive to business interests (e.g. 
Berkhout  et al.,  forthcoming ) . 
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 On the other end, interest groups in Europe are also thought to be more 
detached from constituents than equivalent groups in most domestic systems 
(Kohler-Koch  2013 : 16). Th is relates to the organisational tension identifi ed by 
Schmitter and Streeck ( 1999 : 21) between the logic of membership and the logic 
of infl uence which means that interest associations continually have to manage 
demands from both members and policy-makers. In particular regarding the 
EU, the concern is that interest groups are more focused towards policy-makers 
at the expense of membership demands. Th is is problematic from a democratic 
perspective as interest groups might be more willing to listen to the arguments 
of policy-makers than represent the interests of their members. 
 To date, however, we do not know whether these concerns are valid as there 
have been no direct comparisons of the interest group population in the EU 
with other political systems (but see Mahoney  2008 ). To put it diff erently, while 
we know that there are more business groups active in Europe than other types 
of interest organisations, we do not know whether this relates to the openness 
of the EU system, refl ects an indication of bias, or simply is because economic 
issues are more discussed at this level. Likewise, while we know that groups 
at the European level are rather detached from their membership base, we do 
not know whether this is substantially diff erent from membership involvement 
in domestic political systems. At this point we cannot meaningfully assess 
such questions because comparable data of interest group populations across 
political systems are lacking. To overcome this problem, we aim to provide a 
fi rst comparison of diff erent interest group populations in a single research 
design. We collected interest group population data in four countries (France, 
Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands) and in the EU based on similar 
sampling strategies and coding schemes. Th is design provides us with the best 
opportunity to analyse the uniqueness of the EU compared to domestic interest 
group populations across several dimensions. 
 In our analysis we focus on two dimensions of diversity in interest group 
populations. First, we analyse whether there is a business bias in the EU interest 
group population. Several studies have suggested the existence of an increasing 
mobilisation bias toward business groups at supranational governance levels 
compared to national levels (Baumgartner  et al.  2009 ; Beyers and Kerremans 
 2007 ; Hanegraaff   2015 ). A particular,  sui generis EU version of this argument 
can be found in earlier studies on European integration (Eising  2004 ). To exam-
ine a potential EU business bias, we compare the proportion of business groups 
at the EU system level with those in the four countries included in this study. 
More importantly, we also assess diff erences in business mobilisation at the 
level of policy domains. Th is is important because normative concerns about 
business bias are related to business infl uence on (specifi c) public policies. To do 
this in a meaningful manner, we compare the share of business groups active in 
similar domains such as in agricultural, environmental, or energy policy. If we 
observe a higher proportion of business interest groups within these domains 
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at the EU level compared to the domestic level, this is indeed an indication 
that the institutional characteristics of the EU produce a more severe bias. Yet 
if there is no signifi cant diff erence between the EU and the four countries this 
suggests that characteristics of the policy domains attract business interests 
rather than the specifi c EU institutional environment. 
 Second, we study variation in the representational capacity of groups active 
across diff erent interest group populations. Representational capacity refers to 
the ability of interest groups to operate as mediating organisations by aggregating 
societal interests and translating these interests to policy-makers. In other 
words, we examine how interest groups in the EU and in the four countries 
balance policy interests with membership involvement and hence are capable of 
operating as transmission belts. Th is issue has attracted much attention as it taps 
directly into the debate on whether or not the EU interest groups increasingly 
become part of the so-called ‘Brussels bubble’, thereby potentially ignoring the 
transmission belt function interest groups should play in democratic systems 
(e.g. Kohler-Koch  2013 ; Streeck and Schmitter  1991 ). While most current studies 
emphasise that EU groups are substantially detached from their constituency 
(Kohler-Koch  2013 : 16; Schmitter and Streeck  1999 : 21, 54), some argue 
otherwise. Th e fact that European associations ‘outsource’ membership-oriented 
activities to national associations or affi  liates means that these organisations have 
developed relatively advanced internal structures for membership engagement 
(De Bruycker  et al.  2016 ). As a result, the representative capacity, or the ability 
to translate membership preferences to policy-makers, could in fact be more 
advanced at the EU level. Such strengths can, on the one end, reduce the bias of 
the interest group system by empowering non-business groups, but, on the other 
end, it can also enhance a business bias in case business interest associations 
appear more qualifi ed to ‘transmit’ the concerns of members to policy-makers. 
We therefore also examine whether the representational capacity of diff erent 
types of interest groups varies across the EU and at the domestic level. 
 In the following, we set out our theoretical framework. We discuss our two ana-
lytical concepts of diversity – business bias and bias in representational capacity 
– and how we expect them to vary across the EU and national governance levels. 
We subsequently present our research design, aft er which we test our hypotheses. 
We end with some concluding remarks and an avenue for future research. 
 Organisational diversity across interest group systems 
 Th e diversity of interest group systems has been a traditional concern in the 
interest group literature (Baumgartner and Leech  1998 ; Beyers  et al.  2008 ). A 
biased pattern of interest representation is potentially problematic as it may 
imply that some interests have a magnitude of infl uence that is disproportional 
to their interests in society (Lowery and Gray  2004 ; Lowery  et al.  2015 ). Th is is a 
valid concern, and especially for the EU interest group population, as empirical 
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studies repeatedly show a substantial skewness in the pattern of interest rep-
resentation, such as a dominance of business interests in supranational systems 
such as the EU (Rasmussen and Carroll  2013 ; Schlozman  et al.  2015 ) . 
 Th e question, however, is whether the observed skewness is indeed an indi-
cation that the EU interest population is biased. To answer this question, we 
take up three challenges: fi rst, we follow Lowery and Gray’s ( 2004 : 21) advice 
that the assessment of diversity or bias ‘should entail comparisons across time, 
jurisdictions or venues’. While ‘bias’ may be impossible to identify in absence of 
a proper benchmark of ‘unbiasedness’ (Lowery  et al.  2015 ), comparisons allow 
us to identify relative bias. Second, there is a theoretically unresolved puzzle 
regarding the relationship between the level of government and the likely bias of 
the group system. Th at is, the collective action problems of diff use interests seem 
to be more easily resolved at lower levels through the provision of expressive and 
solidary selective benefi ts (Wilson  1974 : 30–55). Th is should make it easier for 
social movements and civil society groups to maintain themselves locally rather 
than regionally, nationally, or internationally. At the same time, the expansion 
of the scope of confl ict from the lower to higher level potentially favours exactly 
those groups that are typically excluded from narrowly defi ned local confl icts, and 
in that way increase diversity (Schattschneider  1960 ), a phenomenon or mecha-
nism similar to what Keck and Sikkink ( 1998 ) label the ‘boomerang pattern’. Th is 
theoretical conundrum is only infrequently studied empirically: an important 
omission in the population literature is a lack of studies that pay attention to 
multi-level dynamics in interest group populations by comparing geographical 
levels within communities (but note such attention in the United States case, e.g. 
Baumgartner  et al.  2009 ). Th ird, there is an EU-specifi c discussion related to the-
ories of European integration about the relative tendency of several types of inter-
ests to mobilise at the European level. Th ese theoretical debates, in broad strokes, 
relate to incentives on the part of European institutions to seek the backing of 
especially major business interests (Beyers and Kerremans  2007 ; Eising  2007 ). 
 As said, however, suspicions of bias in the EU interest group population 
remain mostly tentative. We lack comparative studies to empirically assess 
whether the EU interest group population is indeed diff erent from those in 
other political systems. To overcome these problems we rely on a comparative 
design to analyse two dimensions of interest group diversity: business bias and 
representational capacity. Both have important normative consequences for 
how we view the EU as a democratic and responsive political system. 
 Business bias 
 Contemporary research on EU interest representation commonly diff erentiates 
between citizen groups and business interest representation (Dür  et al.  2015 ; 
Eising  2004 ,  2007 ; Klüver  2013 ; Rasmussen and Carroll  2013 ). Building on 
this research, we compare the presence of business and other interests in the 
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EU and the national interest group populations. As indicated, several scholars 
suggest that the interest group system in the EU is more biased towards business 
interests than national political systems. 
 First, the EU’s geographical scale exacerbates collective action problems that 
typically aff ect non-business interests in a more severe way. To start with, groups 
vary in the extent to which they have a ‘local’ membership base. Groups that 
rely on national resources to maintain themselves, such as national government 
subsidies or the ‘local’ constituencies of certain unions, are less likely to mobi-
lise at the EU level (Beyers and Kerremans  2007 ). In addition, the so-called 
‘public sphere’ defi cit (e.g. Schlesinger  1999 ) at the EU level, i.e. the absence of a 
common EU media environment hinders mobilisation of non-business groups 
that typically rely on national media sources to arouse salience of the issues 
they stand for and mobilise their constituency. Th is makes it more challenging 
for them to mobilise EU-wide through professional marketing, direct contacts 
with journalists, and joint activities nurturing solidary or purposive benefi ts 
for their constituencies. As a result, the EU interest system is seen by many as 
being biased towards business interests. 
 We contend, however, that assessing bias at the system level does not take into 
consideration that bias is structured at the level of policy domains. For instance, 
it is expected that we would see more citizen group activity on cultural or social 
issues, while the political goals of business groups lead them to be more active 
on economic issues. In other words, it could very well be that the overall bias 
we observe in the EU is not caused by the particular institutional EU context 
but is a function of the type of issues on the agenda of the EU institutions, 
given its explicit mandate to regulate economic, rather than social or cultural 
policies (Majone  1998 ). Despite these trepidations, most scholars still argue 
that the EU favours the input of business groups, regardless of the issue on the 
table (e.g. Bouwen  2004 ; Coen and Katsaitis  2013 ), spurred by the demand of 
EU policy-makers. Coen and Katsaitis ( 2013 ), for instance, note that the reg-
ulatory nature of most EU policies and the small number of the Commission’s 
staff , produces ‘demand’ on the part of policy-makers for technical information. 
Scholars also point out that diff erent EU institutions, most notably the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, attract diff erent types of lobby-
ists (Bouwen  2004 ). Combined, the literature would predict that the EU-level 
interest group population is more biased than the national-level interest group 
populations towards the mobilisation of business groups over other types of 
organisations. We therefore hypothesise that the EU is more biased towards 
business groups both at the system level and at the level of policy domains. 
Regarding the latter hypothesis, we take into consideration that it has not yet 
been tested directly but is based on aggregate assessments of bias in the EU. It 
could be that at the level of policy domains business bias is absent.
 Hypothesis 1: Th e EU interest group population as a whole and per domain is 
more biased towards business than national interest group populations. 
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 Representational capacity 
 Our second conceptualisation of diversity takes into account how interest 
groups balance their political orientation with their membership orientation. 
We refer to the combination of interest aggregation and interest articulation as 
representational capacity. We defi ne representational capacity as the capability 
of groups to manage the membership involvement with the exercise of political 
infl uence. Th is directly builds upon the organisational tension identifi ed by 
Schmitter and Streeck ( 1999 : 21–54) between the logic of membership and the 
logic of infl uence: interest associations continually have to manage demands 
from both members and policy-makers. Th is is not an easy task. Members put 
other demands on interest organisations than policy-makers. Members prefer 
organisations with a clearly demarcated identity so that their interests align 
with those of other members and are distinct from other organisations. To 
ensure their support in the form of dues, participation in (voluntary) activi-
ties, and information on what members prefer, organisations have to provide 
selective benefi ts, such as services or collective insurances to their membership. 
Ensuring membership engagement with the organisation thus calls for rela-
tively specialised organisations so that members perceive their interests to be 
properly represented. Policy-makers, on the other hand, require a distinct set 
of policy-relevant information, including constituency information, technical 
expertise, but also information about broad societal support. In other words, 
they prefer generalist organisations to have a guarantee on the legitimate nature 
of the policy input (see also Kohler  et al. 2017 ). Th is tension can lead organi-
sations to specialise in the provision of policy input (similar to think tanks) or 
the involvement of members (similar to social clubs). 
 Assuming some level of organisational specialisation, conceptualising 
diversity in terms of representational capacity is relevant in at least two 
important ways. First, it points our attention to the kind of policy informa-
tion we can expect groups to off er to policy-makers. In broad terms, this 
may be information on the interest or preference of the members of the 
organisation or it may be information on the technical quality of certain 
proposals (Bouwen  2004 ; Braun  2012 ). Organisations with a strong focus on 
membership involvement are more likely to provide a diff erent type of policy 
information compared to organisations with a well-developed policy orienta-
tion (Daugbjerg  et al.,  2017 ). Hence, organisational specialisation results in 
diff erent kinds of interest groups capable of off ering distinct types of policy 
information (Minkoff   et al.  2008 ). 
 Second, the way in which interest groups strike a balance between policy 
infl uence and membership involvement determines the extent to which they 
are capable of performing a ‘transmission belt’ function. Aft er all, attribut-
ing a transmission belt function assumes that interest groups simultaneously 
transmit societal interests to policy-makers and convey policy compromises 
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to their membership (Braun  2015 ; Halpin and Fraussen  2017 ). Th is notion is 
especially relevant in neo-corporatist approaches to interest representation 
(Schmitter and Streeck  1999 ) and particularly applicable to the EU context as 
the European Commission explicitly requires such an intermediary function 
of the groups it reaches out to (European Commission  2001 ; Kohler-Koch 
and Finke  2007 ). 
 Th e representational capacity of interest groups and the diff erent dimensions 
groups tend to prioritise are likely to vary across national- and EU-level inter-
est group populations. First, the relative ‘weakness’ of EU-level policy-makers 
allows interest groups, even when relatively non-cohesive or specialist, to be 
involved in the political process. Th is should produce a relatively strong focus 
on interest articulation at the EU level compared to the national level. Second, as 
regards the membership environment of European umbrella groups, we expect 
multi-layered European federations to ‘outsource’ their membership-oriented 
activities to national associations or affi  liates. We expect that these organisations 
have advanced internal structures for membership engagement, off ering mul-
tiple types of membership and well-developed channels for engagement in EU 
public policy-making. By comparison, at the national level, such a specialised 
type of organisation would not exist and similar types of task division are also 
unlikely. As a result, we hypothesise:
 Hypothesis 2: EU-level interest groups have stronger representational capacity 
than interest groups active at the national level. 
 Design 
 To test our hypotheses, we compare the composition of national-level and 
EU-level populations of politically interested membership organisations. Th is 
data collection strategy is in line with recent mapping studies of interest group 
populations (Berkhout  et al.,  forthcoming ; Halpin and Jordan  2011 ). Next to 
the EU level, we select four member states: France, United Kingdom, Germany 
and the Netherlands. As our expectations relate to diff erences between the 
EU and national-level political systems, we do not focus on systemic factors 
explaining variation across national-level interest group populations. At the 
same time, by selecting four countries considered to belong to diff erent inter-
est representation regime types (e.g. Balme and Chabanet  2008 : 28) ‒ the UK 
as a pluralist system, the Netherlands and Germany as corporatist systems, 
and France as statist system ‒ we enhance the external validity of the observed 
diff erences between the EU and these diff erent types of member states. We 
combine top-down (policy-oriented) and bottom-up (mobilisation-oriented) 
mapping strategies to construct representative samples of the organisational 
populations. Th e use of diff erent types of sources reduces potential sampling 
bias (cf. Berkhout and Lowery  2008 ). Th ese sources include, fi rst, directories 
NATIONAL INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EU MULTILEVEL SYSTEM
177
of associations, most notably the European directory of Public Aff airs (2014), 
OECKL Deutschland (2011), 1  the Pyttersen Almanak (2014), 2  the Directory 
of British Associations (2012), 3  and a combination of French lists of asso-
ciations. 4  Th e sections listing business, professional and trade associations, 
and the section on NGOs of the European Public Aff airs Directory are com-
parable to the relevant sections of the national directories of associations. 
Secondly, from the ‘top down’, we include membership organisations active in 
the parliaments and sample these from: the Lobby register of the Bundestag 
(2014), the register of accredited lobbyists to the European Parliament as can 
be found in the EU Transparency Register (2014), and from the participants 
in hearings and roundtables in the French (2011–2014), Dutch (2011) and 
British (2011) parliaments. Th e Dutch and British parliamentary lists have 
been shared by researchers in the Interarena project (see Helboe Pedersen 
 et al.  2015 ). Th e sample sizes vary between 309 interest associations in the 
Netherlands and 448 interest associations in the United Kingdom amounting 
to a total of 1785 interest associations. 
 Th ese sampling procedures do not produce perfectly comparable samples of 
interest groups. First, as regards the directories, for the French case we could 
not rely on a general inclusive directory and used alternative lists instead. Th is 
makes the inclusion of established, professionalised associations in the French 
case more likely than in the other cases. Th e fi gures presenting data on mem-
bership involvement in the French case (Figure  3 ) should be read with this in 
mind. Second, as regards the parliamentary data, the Bundestag and European 
Parliament registers do not require ‘invitation’ on the part of members of the 
parliament whereas presence in the parliamentary hearings in the UK, France 
and the Netherlands does. We do not aspire to compare the individual member 
states with each other and these diff erences largely average out in the compar-
ison with the EU. 
 Data collection 
 To examine our two concepts of diversity (group type and representational 
capacity), we rely on information provided on the websites of the interest 
groups. Th is information has been coded by six extensively trained master’s stu-
dents. Th e coders are fl uent in at least two languages and were assigned records 
from multiple countries and sources. Th e data sources were sampled randomly 
and the sample presented below includes a suffi  cient number of organisations 
for the aggregate-level analysis undertaken. Th e intercoder-reliability test shows 
that  coders reached higher agreement on the policy interest scale (Krippendorff  
Alpha 0.61) than on the members-service scale (Krippendorff  Alpha 0.38). Note 
that when accounting for co-variation, these scores need not be interpreted 
conservatively (Neuendorf  2002 : 152). Records coded in the fi rst months of the 
data collection were coded by two coders (25%) and only included when the 
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coders agreed on the selection of the organisation and its types of members. 
Th is implies that for the data we use in this paper the intercoder-reliability 
scores are higher than for the test records. Th e operationalisation of the (in)
dependent variables is summarised in Table  1 . 
 We have two dependent variables. Th e fi rst dependent variable, business 
bias, is the proportion of business interest associations per policy domain. We 
distinguish between business associations and other interests based on their 
types of members. Associations with commercial fi rms as members are business 
interest associations. As said, we focus on bias in policy domains because nor-
mative concerns about the ‘overrepresentation’ of business interests are mainly 
related to the presumably business-friendly implications for policy-making. 
To see whether or not policy-makers in the EU are more receptive to business 
groups than those at the national level, we need to compare bias at the level of 
policy-makers which are structured along policy domains (Pappi and Henning 
 1998 : 554–6). We use the UN Classifi cation of the Functions of Government 
(COFOG) to measure policy domains. Each organisation is coded in the most 
specifi c category applicable. We then aggregate these categories into 18 policy 
domains. Organisations may be active in multiple policy fi elds, but we rely 
only on the area which coders judged to be the most important. Overall, this 
provides us with the proportion of business groups per policy domain across 
the four countries and the EU. 
 We disaggregate our second dependent variable, representational capacity, 
into three distinct components. First, the variation in policy interest is the 
extent to which organisations provide policy input and position themselves in 
relation to specifi c public policy programmes. Th is is indicated in press or policy 
statements published on the website. Second, student coders classify the extent 
to which the organisation involves members in organisational decision-making 
and activities. Th is includes participatory structures such as committees, mem-
bership meetings and internal elections aimed at aggregating and representing 
the preferences of members. Th ird, we combine these measures into a single 
indicator of the organisations’ capability to represent interests. More specifi cally, 
we construct a dummy variable that identifi es organisations with high levels 
of policy involvement and membership involvement (scores of 4 or higher). 
It follows that these interest groups have high representational capacities and 
are capable to perform the transmission belt function (see Appendix for full 
coding instructions). 
 Th e independent variable in both analyses is the variation across the fi ve 
political systems (the EU and the four countries). We thereby aim at isolating 
the institutional eff ect that causes the variation in interest group diversity, in 
particular the distinction between EU and national-level political systems. We 
include country dummy variables in the analyses to see whether the countries 
and the EU diff er regarding the proportion of business groups active and the 
representational capacity of individual organisations. 
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 Table 1.   Variables, operationalisation and measurement. 
 Variable  Variable description  Details 
 Dependent variables   
 Business bias   Proportion of business interests 
in policy domain  
 Based on membership variable (see 
below)  
 Representational capacity 1 – 
policy interest dimension 
 Policy interest: the extent to 
which an organisation is 
involved in policy-making  
 1 to 6 scale that indicates no policy 
interest at all (1) and full policy 
interest (6). (see Appendix for full 
coding-scheme) 
 Representational capacity 2 – 
membership dimension 
 Membership involvement: the 
extent to which an organisa-
tion involves its membership 
in decision-making  
 1 to 6 scale that indicates member-
ship involvement ranging from: 
involvement at all (1) to fully run by 
members (6) (see Appendix) 
 Representational capacity 3 – 
‘ideal type transmission belt’ 
 Combination of policy interest 
and membership dimension  
 Variable based on policy interest and 
membership involvement scales. 
 Dummy variable: 1 = organisations 
with a score higher than 4 on both 
scales; 0 = organisations with lower 
scores on both scales 
 Independent variable   
 Institutional eff ect (H1 and H2)  Eff ect of diff erent governance 
levels 
 Dummy variables that represent 
variation between: the Netherlands, 
the UK, France, Germany and the 
EU level 
 Control variables    
 Density   Number of interest groups per 
policy domain in member 
state/EU level  
 Proportions per policy domain based 
on the COFOG classifi cation (see 
 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/regis-
try/regcst.asp?Cl=4 ; and below) 
 Policy competence  Extent to which a policy 
domain is an EU competency; 
conversion table of COFOG 
coding into EU or national 
competencies 
 EU competency: 05: Environmental 
protection; 0.42: Agriculture 
 Shared competency: 01: General 
public services; 02: Defence; 04: 
Economic aff airs; 0.43: Energy; 0.44: 
Manufacturing and construction; 
0.54: Landscape protection; 0.45: 
Transport 
 National competency: 03: Public 
order and safety; 06: Housing and 
community amenities; 07: Health; 
08: Recreation, culture and religion; 
09: Education; 10: Social protection; 
0.73: Hospital services; 0.82: Culture; 
10.4: Family; 10.7: Social exclusion 
 Group type  Business vs other groups; based 
on type of members 
 Dummy variable: 1 = Members are 
commercial fi rms, 0 = Members are 
not fi rms. In Table  3 : additional cate-
gory used: members are individuals 
as professional 
 
 Membership structure  Presence of decentralised 
organisational units, such as 
geographical or functional 
chapters, or sub-associations 
 Does the organisation have an ‘indirect’ 
membership structure?  
 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
 Social/leisure focus  Organisations that are predom-
inantly focused on social or 
leisure goals  
 Domain of membership according to 
the International Classifi cation of 
Non-Profi t Organizations is: 
 1)  Group 1 ‘Culture and recreation’ or 
Group 10 ‘Religion’ 
 2)  Not in any of these 
 
180
 We also control for several factors. For our fi rst analysis, on business bias, 
a fi rst crucial control variable is the competency-level of policy domains. Th e 
main reason for doing so is the strong regulatory nature of the EU system, 
implying a large amount of economic competences. Th is means that any skew-
ness towards business groups might be a result of the type of issues that are 
dealt with rather than a function of system-level institutional prioritisation of 
business interests. We use a conversion table (see Table  1 ) based on our own 
assessment of policy competence of policy domains and distinguish among 
domains of EU competence, shared and national competences. Secondly, we 
control for the density of the policy domain, as business bias could be a result 
of the crowdedness of policy domains, although previous fi ndings are incon-
clusive in this regard. Th at is, at the level of issues, Baumgartner and Leech 
( 2001 ) suggest that business interest organisations are more likely than others to 
maintain presence on issues with a low density, whereas Berkhout  et al. ( 2016 ) 
found a higher relative presence of business interests on ‘crowded’ issues. To 
measure the relative density, we use the proportions of actor types per policy 
domain in each system. 
 We add three controls to the analyses on representational capacity. First, we 
control for group type (business or professional group). Firms, as members of 
associations, are already ‘organised’ and their participation is likely to be of a 
diff erent kind than that of individual citizens (e.g. Off e and Wiesenthal  1980 ). 
Second, we control for the nature of the membership structure (presence of 
geographical or functional chapters or sub-associations). Such subsections are 
tools used to manage organisational consensus formation and should therefore 
be positively related to membership involvement. Finally, we also control for 
predominant social or leisure goals of organisations. Such goals are likely to 
reduce the policy orientation of groups and aff ect the nature of the membership 
involvement. Th ey are likely to lower the representative capacity of groups. 
 Analysis 
 Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First we descriptively assess business bias 
across the diff erent levels of governance. By means of a multivariate OLS-
regression analysis, we subsequently examine the statistical signifi cance of these 
diff erences between the EU and national levels while controlling for several 
alternative explanations of bias. Second, aft er describing diff erences regarding 
the representative capacity of organisations we follow up with regression anal-
yses to account for the variation between the EU and national levels. 
 Figure  1 shows the proportion of associations representing fi rms as members 
per system. Using this measure, about half of the groups in the EU are business 
associations. Th is is consistent with fi ndings in recent studies (see Berkhout 
 et al.,  forthcoming ; Lowery  et al.  2015 ). Th e share of business interest groups 
in the EU is similar to that in France and higher than those in the Netherlands 
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and the United Kingdom. Please note that we here operationalise bias in the 
form of proportions of group types per political system rather than per policy 
domain (as we will do in the regression analysis in Table  2 ). Moving to the 
domain level allows us to examine diff erences in bias across domains. Th is 
matters greatly for our understanding of the policy implications of bias because 
averages per system mask the strong bias that exists in certain policy domains. 
Th at is, as a crude indicator, 13 out of 91 policy domains have 100% business 
interest representation, whereas in seven of them we note a complete absence of 
business interests. Th ere must be important sector-level dynamics that explain 
such variation. We will examine this in the regression models in Table  2 . 
 To test whether business bias can be explained by systemic, institutional 
eff ects we ran a multivariate OLS-regression analysis on the proportion of 
business interests per policy fi eld. Th e country coeffi  cients restate the minor 
cross-national diff erences observed in Figure  1 . We control for the organisa-
tional density of the policy domain and do not fi nd a signifi cant relationship. 
Th is means that business bias is unrelated to the number of organisations active 
within a given community. Th is is in contrast to fi ndings at the level of issues 
(Baumgartner and Leech  2001 ; Berkhout  et al.  2016 ), where business interest 
organisations were found to have lower (US), respectively higher (EU), relative 
presence on ‘crowded’ issues. Th e bottom rows of the table indicate that a larger 
proportion of business interest organisations is active in policy domains in 
which the EU – rather than the member states – enjoys exclusive competences. 
Areas of exclusive EU competences, such as trade and market regulation, attract 
 Figure 1.   Proportion of business interests per political system.
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business interest organisations to a stronger extent than other interest groups, 
regardless of this being at the EU or national level. 
 We now turn to the second part of the empirical analysis in which we focus 
on representational capacity, and for which we individually assess policy inter-
est, membership involvement and subsequently examine the combination of 
a group’s policy interest and membership involvement. High scores on both 
dimensions indicate a strong representational capacity. We start by presenting 
the frequency distributions of the policy interest and membership involvement 
scales in Figures  2 and  3 . Th e national distributions resemble each other. As 
can be seen in Figure  2 , around 20% of the organisations is fully committed 
to infl uencing public policy, and, when adding up the proportions of the top 
categories on the x-axis (labelled 4, 5 and 6) one fi nds that around 40% of the 
organisations falls into any of these categories (ranging from 33% in the United 
Kingdom to 44% in Germany). Th e organisations in these national systems also 
are relatively similar regarding the extent to which they allow members to be 
involved in the organisation. Around 40% of the organisations provide substan-
tial opportunities for members to engage within the organisation (Figure  3 ). 
 Th e key diff erence is between the organisations active in the EU and those 
active at the national level. EU-level organisations are defi nitively more policy-
oriented, with about 50% aiming to infl uence policy, and surely less open to 
involve their members in strategic decision-making. Less than 10% of them 
fully embrace membership control over the organisation. Around 30% (labelled 
5) does allow substantial membership input. Consequently, the diff erences 
between the EU and the national systems in the sums of the top categories 
(labelled 4, 5 and 6) are quite substantial (ranging from 58% in the EU to 83% in 
Germany). Th ese diff erences are in line with our expectations. Th ey indicate that 
EU-level interest groups tend to be better at engaging with policy-makers rather 
 Table 2.   OLS regression on the proportion of business interest associations per policy do-
main,  n = 90 policy domains in four countries. 
 Standardised beta coeffi  cients;  t statistics in parentheses;  n = 90. 
 * p  < 0.10 ;  ** p  < 0.05 ;  *** p  < 0.01. 
 Country   The Netherlands  −0.15 
 Reference category: European Union  ( 1.27) 
 France  0.18 
 (1.53) 
 United Kingdom  −0.15 
 ( 1.33) 
 Germany  0.10 
 (0.88) 
 Density  Proportion of organisations in policy fi eld   0.089 
 (0.93) 
 Policy competence  National competence  −0.53 ***  
 ( 4.12) 
 Mixed national/EU competence  −0.16 
 ( 1.24) 
  R 2   0.32 
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than with their members when compared to national groups (see also Kohler-
Koch and Buth  2013 ). Nonetheless, we note that EU organisations tend to score 
relatively high on both dimensions. Moreover, these aggregate diff erences do 
 Figure 2.   Organisational orientation per political system: frequency distributions of scores 
on policy interest.
 Figure 3.   Organisational orientation per political system: frequency distributions of scores 
on membership involvement.
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not tell us much about the specialisation of individual organisations and may 
no longer hold when controlling for organisational factors. We look at this in 
the discussion of Table  3 . 
 Table  3 presents nine OLS and three logistic regression analyses on the policy 
involvement and member involvement of the individual interest organisations 
studied in the EU and the four member states. Th ese are clustered in three 
models. Model 1 assesses whether EU-level groups have indeed a stronger 
representative capacity than national-level groups (hypothesis 2). We compare 
the countries and control for clubs interested in culture and social activities. 5  
Th ese tend to be more numerous at the national level than at the European 
level. Th e nature of the participation of members in these organisations is, 
partially, of a diff erent kind than the decision-making-oriented participation 
common in other types of organisations included in our study. Th e coeffi  cients 
are signifi cant in the expected directions (negative for policy interest, positive 
for membership involvement, negative for the combined measure). As already 
observed in Figures  2 and  3 , the orientations towards polices and members 
diff er between EU-level groups and national groups. As can be seen from the 
negative coeffi  cients in Model 1(1), national interest organisations tend to be 
less policy interested than EU-level organisations. Th e reverse is the case for 
membership involvement, Model 1(2). Th e logistic regressions assess the likeli-
hood that organisations have high scores on both policy interest and member-
ship involvement (>4). Th e negative signifi cant coeffi  cients reported in Model 
1(3) indicate that EU organisations generally are ‘stronger’ than their national 
counterparts. Th ey are more likely to have high scores on both dimensions, 
and, in that way, should be able to develop stronger representational functions 
than national organisations. 
 Model 2 controls for the type and structure of membership. Th e positive and 
signifi cant coeffi  cients in all sub-models indicate that business, professional and 
multi-levelled associations compared to other organisations are more likely to 
be interested in public policy, engage members and combine these functions. 
Also note that the addition of these explanatory variables adds only little explan-
atory power to the models (compare Model 1 and Model 2). Th is indicates 
that when it comes to representational capacity, cross-national diff erences are 
more important than the diff erences among the types of interest represented. 
In Model 3 we include an interaction eff ect between EU and business inter-
est associations. Th e coeffi  cient of this variable is positive and signifi cant for 
Models 3(8) and 3(9) on membership involvement and representative capac-
ity. Business interest associations in the EU, compared to those active at the 
national level, are more likely to involve members and, as a consequence, more 
capable in representing interests in the policy process. We visually present the 
strength of this relationship in Figure  4 where we plot the predicted probabili-
ties of the representative capacity of business interest associations versus other 
association in the EU and the member states studied. 6  Th e fi gure demonstrates 
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that business interest associations have a stronger representational capacity, in 
particular those at the EU level. 
 Conclusion 
 Th is paper is a fi rst attempt to compare interest group populations across gov-
ernance levels in the EU. More precisely, we compared the business bias and 
representational capacity of interest groups in the EU with those in France, 
the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. As regards business bias, we found no 
substantial diff erences between the interest group population at the European 
level and those at the national level. Our analyses suggest that system-level 
variation is not associated with this variation but that policy competences are 
and possibly also other policy domain-related factors. Th is is in line with the 
fi nding that interest group mobilisation is largely specifi c to policy domain 
or issue (Berkhout  et al.,  forthcoming ). Put more concretely, this means that, 
overall, there might be more business groups active in Europe, but at the level 
of policy issues, for instance as regards agriculture, the environment or con-
struction policy, the share of business groups in the EU compares to their 
shares in the four countries. Th is fi nding supports the idea that business bias is 
related to the type of issues on the EU legislative agenda rather than the eff ect 
of institutional characteristics. 
 In terms of representational capacity we fi nd a stronger policy engagement 
at the EU level as opposed to the national level and a stronger membership 





















Member countries studied European Union
 Figure 4.    Predicted probabilities of the representative capacity of business interest 
associations versus other associations in the EU and four member states, adapted version 
of Model 3(9) from Table  3 .
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our results also suggest that in particular EU-level organisations with either 
professionals or fi rms as members and a multi-level membership structure 
have the strongest representational capacity. So, although in terms of busi-
ness bias the diversity of the interest group population at EU level does not 
seem to be as limited as is commonly argued, in terms of our second aspect 
of diversity, representational capacity, the EU-level system seems more biased 
to business interests. Th ey seem, across the board, to perform better in terms 
of representational capacity than other types of interests. Th e bias towards 
business in the numbers of organisations active is consequently exacerbated 
by the organisational capacity of business interest associations to aggregate 
and articulate interests. 
 We would like to identify a number of venues for future research. First, 
business bias is a far more complex phenomenon than commonly understood. 
Th at is, business and non-business interests do not randomly distribute over 
policy domains. And various factors aff ect this process. Some country-specifi c 
institutions may encourage encompassing interest aggregation, certain policy 
domains may be very open to various groups, and certain interests are just not 
easy to organise. Second, assuming that we want to study implications for pub-
lic policy or representation more broadly, business bias must be related to the 
varying capacities of organisations to exhibit meaningful activities in relation 
to politics. In other words, this means that the ‘transmission belt’ function of 
interest organisations is deeply related to questions about bias. Th at is, ‘trans-
mission’ puts substantial organisational demands on groups that only relatively 
strong groups are willing and able to develop. Our fi nding that there is a strong 
correlation between business interests and representational capacity suggests 
that especially business interests are better transmission belts than others, and 
that this is particularly the case at the EU level. Th is is in line with previous 
research demonstrating that more consultation practices seem to reinforce 
existing biases (De Bièvre  et al.  2015 ). Th is is normatively problematic in light 
of the Commission’s deliberate outreach to civil society organisations on pre-
cisely the grounds of their representational capacity (Perez-Solorzano Borragan 
and Smismans  2012 ). Th ird, the limited fi ndings on diff erence between EU 
and national political systems also nuance arguments about the eff ect of polit-
ical institutions for the formation of interest group communities. Institutional 
factors such as the legal competence of policy-makers matter at the level of 
policy domains rather than political systems. In addition, supply factors, i.e. the 
structure of the economy and salience of issues in a given geographical setting 
as well as the internal structure of interest groups, seem to outweigh attempts 
by government to structure the composition of interest group communities 
(Berkhout  et al.  2015 ). 
 Our study is hopefully a stepping stone towards more comparative studies 
of interest group populations. Over the last decade students of interest groups 
have started to map interest group population in many countries. Our study 
NATIONAL INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EU MULTILEVEL SYSTEM
188
shows the potential relevance of comparing the outcomes of these studies. We 
therefore urge other scholars to engage in comparative studies of interest group 
density and diversity across diff erent political systems, but even more so across 
diff erent policy domains within distinct political systems. 
 Notes 
 1.  We rely on the selection of 4830 ‘politically active’ associations by Jentges 
 et al. ( 2012 ). 
 2.  Th e Dutch Pyttersen’s Almanak (2014), section A, lists 9601 collective action 
organisations which are (primarily) non-profi t and ‘of supra-local interest’. 
 3.  Th e Directory of British Associations reports collective action organisations 
of ‘national’ interest. 
 4.  Th ere is no French directory of associations similar to the directories in the other 
countries. Similar to the EUROLOB II project (Kohler-Koch  et al.  2017 ), we 
therefore use the members of the two major business interest federations. Th ese 
are the 220 professional member-federations of the French association for small- 
and medium-sized companies  Confédération Général des Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises (CGPME) (see  http://www.cgpme.fr/le-reseau/federations ) and 
the 87 member-federations of the major employers’ federation  Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France (MEDEF) (see  http://www.medef.com/medef-corporate/
le-medef/federations.html ). Th e study also includes the 133 members ( Titulaire 
and  Suppleant ) of the  Le conseil national de la vie associative (2014) in order to 
guarantee the inclusion of French citizen groups (see  http://www.associations.
gouv.fr/112-le-conseil-national-de-la-vie.html ). 
 5.  Organisations classifi ed under Group 1 and Group 10 of the International 
Classifi cation of Non-Profi t Organisations. 
 6.  We calculated these probabilities on the basis of an adapted version of Model 
3(9) from Table  3 . We contrasted the EU-level groups to all national groups 
rather than including each country as a dummy variable. 
 Disclosure statement 
 No potential confl ict of interest was reported by the authors. 
 Funding 
 We would like to acknowledge the fi nancial support of the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientifi c Research project [grant number 461-10-519]. 
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 Appendix.  Coding scheme concerning the dimensions of 
representational capacity 
 Representational  capacity  1. No mention of interest representation before government or through 
creating broader awareness 
 - Policy-interest scale  2. Interest representation is mentioned in mission statement or some-
where else on website, but no mention of policy-oriented activities 
 3. Minimal policy-oriented activities reported, such as: ‘the association 
land owners fi nd sustainable forest management important’ 
 4. One or two concrete policy-oriented activities found, including moni-
toring and information-oriented activities 
 5. A separate section of the website reports on policy campaigns and 
positions, or throughout the website one fi nds references to public 
policy, including indirect strategies such as creating awareness 
 6. The policy section is substantial and includes several diff erent types of 
documents (policy statement, public campaigns, etc.) 
 Representational  capacity  1. The members only transfer money (e.g. called ‘donors’ or ‘supporters’) 
 - Membership involvement 
scale  
 2. Members may have some offi  cial rights but there is no explicit refer-
ence to this 
 3. Members are called ‘members’, and seem  formally  to  have voting 
rights 
 4. Members have some opportunity to participate in the  organisation , 
such as through volunteering 
 5. Members have several ways to participate and decision - makers have 
a track-record within the  organisation /cause 
 6. Members fully run the  organisation , also paid staff  seem to be 
selected primarily on the basis of their loyalty to the cause rather than 
management experience (e.g. association of doctors is managed by a 
doctor) 
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